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WHAT IS THE “SOCIAL” IN “SOCIAL
COHERENCE?” COMMENTARY ON NELSON
TEBBE’S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN
EGALITARIAN AGE
BY PATRICIA MARINO
It is my pleasure to comment on Nelson Tebbe’s deep and
engaging book. In addition to its careful legal analysis, Religious
Freedom in an Egalitarian Age1 bears on important philosophical
issues concerning values, moral reasoning and the justification of
evaluative beliefs. I find these issues especially interesting
because I’ve engaged with some of them myself. Methodologically,
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age2 makes use of a concept
of social coherence, and my work also considers questions of how
coherence functions in evaluative contexts. What does it mean for
our value judgments to fit together in an appropriate way? How
can we use coherence to discover and justify evaluative beliefs?
How is coherence related to agreement and disagreement, and
what are the limits of coherence approaches? In my recent book, I
consider these questions from a point of view that focuses
specifically on moral judgments, and I argue for a perspective on
“moral coherence” that has much in common with the “social
coherence” model Professor Tebbe outlines.3 In this comment, I
want to explore the ways in which that perspective both does and
does not fit with the one Professor Tebbe develops throughout his
legal analysis.
In framing my approach, I start from the idea that we value
pluralistically, endorsing multiple values like benevolence, justice,
liberty, and fidelity which can conflict and cause moral dilemmas.
Coherence, in my view, does not require rejecting value pluralism
1 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017).
2
Id.
3
PATRICIA MARINO, MORAL REASONING IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (2015).
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or aiming toward single-principle theories like utilitarianism, in
which the right action is always the one that brings about the most
overall happiness or well-being. Instead, coherence requires
finding principled compromises among conflicting values, and
being “case consistent” -- which means judging morally similar
cases similarly when there are no morally significant differences
between them. Moral conflicts and difficult judgment calls are to
be expected, and are not a sign of bad reasoning. I call my view of
principled compromises and case consistency “pluralist
coherence,” and I think people often appeal to something like it.
For example, in the abortion debate, it is common to hear
interlocutors accuse one another of being “inconsistent”: of not
treating similar cases that are like one another in morally relevant
features.
There are important points of agreement between our
approaches, and I find many of Professor Tebbe’s particular claims
to be important, justified, and under-appreciated. For example, too
often in evaluative domains the idea of “coherence” is interpreted
in a way that favors the pursuit of single principle theories -- the
implication being, as Professor Tebbe says, that in the absence of
moral absolutes, what we end up with is hopelessly arbitrary.4 I
think Professor Tebbe is absolutely right to say that value
conflicts, dilemmas, and uncertainty are compatible with
appropriate forms of reasoning and justification, and that we do
not need absolutism to say there are reasons in favor of one
outcome over another. Also, Professor Tebbe is correct to
emphasize the way that our judgments can be socially influenced
yet still form apt starting points for evaluative reflection.5 This is
because understanding what matters and why always requires an
appeal to judgments, and those judgments are always formed in a
social environment. That we must appeal to our judgment in
deciding how to balance conflicting values does not make those
decisions unjustified or ad hoc, since appealing to judgment is how
we generally move forward in ethical thinking.
So there are obviously many opinions that Professor Tebbe
and I share. But there are important differences between my
“pluralist coherence” and Professor Tebbe’s “social coherence.” My
4
5

NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017).
Id.
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approach is what Professor Tebbe calls “individualistic”: a person
begins from a set of moral judgments and uses pluralist coherence
to improve them.6 Whether those judgments are widely shared or
socially accepted is not directly relevant to this process, since an
individual’s views can be internally coherent, even if their moral
beliefs differ radically from those shared by their community. In
fact, from the point of view of pluralist coherence, there can be
multiple sets of moral beliefs that are internally coherent yet
disagree with one another.7
In my view, an important aspect of why there is so much
moral disagreement and diversity has to do the fact that the way
people value is pluralistic in two senses. First, there are the
elements of “value pluralism” that I sketched above: we hold
multiple, sometimes-conflicting values, ones that are not reducible
to a single overarching value or a super-value.8 We value respect
for individual persons and the collective good; we respect fidelity
and honesty; we care about liberty, equality, and justice. These not
only conflict in particular circumstances, but also seem to
represent different kinds of goods and resist expression in terms
of a single unifying value.9 Second, while we often share values,
different people direct their cares at different objects and prioritize
amongst them in different ways.10 For example, with respect to
prioritization, some people may prize justice and fairness above
all, overriding considerations related to the common good, while
others who prioritize differently, allowing that in some cases, the
collective good is most important. Overall, Americans are famous
for valuing and prioritizing autonomy, even when the demands of
respecting individual autonomy seem to conflict with other values
such as benevolence.
As I see it, these pluralisms help explain some diversity in
moral judgments. For example, in deciding whether it is
appropriate to lie to protect a friend, a person who values honesty
most may say no, while one who values loyalty most may say yes.
And in the abortion debate, it is possible for people to value the
potential life of a developing fetus, and also to value a woman’s
6
Id.
7
Id,
8
PATRICIA MARINO, MORAL REASONING IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (2015).
9
Id.
10 Id.
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autonomy rights to control her body, yet completely disagree about
abortion, because those who prioritize the latter will be pro-choice
and those who prioritize the former will not. This connection
between diversity and conflict explains why so much moral
disagreement seems to arise in the contexts of dilemmas, in which
there is more than one value at stake, and as an individual we feel
pulled in different directions.
From this framing, it follows that moral disagreements can
arise in two different ways. Sometimes people roughly share
values and prioritizations, but one person is failing to be case
consistent -- that is, to judge the same way those cases they
themselves would see as similar in significant ways. This can
occur, for example, because of the well-known phenomenon of
framing effects, where we judge differently cases that are identical
in all the facts, only because of the way the cases are presented
and described. For instance, sometimes when a given tax policy is
described in terms of exemptions, it is judged to be unfair, but
when described in terms of benefits, it is judged to be fair -- and
this is because of framing effects. Where our judgments are
distorted by emotions, self-interest, and contextual influences, we
fail to judge cases consistently, and this lead to the kinds of
disagreements where one person is mistaken.11 In these cases,
coherence reasoning can help us reach a consensus, by showing us
how genuinely consistent moral theorizing would support some
particular conclusion.
But in my view, disagreement can also arise for more
fundamental reasons, arising from the way people direct and
prioritize values differently on a deeper level.12 In the latter kind
of situation, disagreement can be entrenched: even when both
sides are reasoning consistently and well, deep differences in value
prioritization means that they will never agree. For the person
who prioritizes honesty over fidelity and the one who prioritizes
fidelity over honesty, and for the people who prioritize autonomy
rights and the value of a developing fetus differently, coherence
will not lead to consensus or agreement. This is because, as we’ve
seen, when people direct and prioritize values differently, there
can be multiple internally coherent moral sets of beliefs. When
11
12

Id.
Id.
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disagreements are due to deep differences in values and priorities,
I think that arguments and reasoning run out: in these cases
moral change happens through social and cultural changes, helped
along through means like personal activism, art, and literature.13
As Professor Tebbe notes, from this kind of “individualistic”
point of view, even morally abhorrent systems can be internally
coherent:14 such systems, I argue, ought to be criticized on moral
grounds rather than through charges of incoherence and
irrationality. For example, defenders of slavery in the pre-Civil
War American South may have been internally consistent; the
problem is that their moral beliefs reflect a profoundly
mistaken sense of what is just, right, and so on. In contrast,
Professor Tebbe’s model of “social coherence” is meant to point us
toward consensus.15 Social coherence tries to avoid the
individualistic perspective on coherence, and emphasizes the
possibility of shared reasoning, even in the face of entrenched
disagreement. The idea, I take it, is that in the context of legal
reasoning, we can find and appeal to a shared initial perspective
to generate conclusions that we all must recognize as justified.
Thus, the problem of multiple internally coherent systems that
disagree with one another does not arise.
My main question here is how, exactly, this shared
perspective should be understood. Who, exactly, is the “we” who
shares it? At some points, Professor Tebbe uses phrases like
“constitutional understandings”16 and “precedents and principles
that are authoritative among contemporary American jurists.” 17
This suggests what I would consider a more “formal” approach:
social coherence means coherence with a set of specific texts and
previous decisions. In other places, though, Professor Tebbe seems
to move away from the formal approach, saying that we can appeal
to “shared understandings,”18 and “[m]eanings that are deeply
rooted and sufficiently widespread.”19 Giving the example of

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

PATRICIA MARINO, MORAL REASONING IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (2015).
NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017).
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 38.
NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE, 44 (2017).
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marriage equality, he describes how we can change our system by
“engaging in critique.”20
From the point of view of legal theory and practice, there is
obviously much to be said for this kind of formal approach as a
practical system for moving things forward. But from a broader
evaluative point of view, it faces various well-known limitations -some of which seem to make change and critique impossible. In its
talk of specific texts and precedent, the formal approach risks
inflexibility, conflating “coherence” with “consistency through
time.” How could change happen? Furthermore, the formal
approach makes the possibility of moral critique obscure. If
opinions that are out of step with a set of texts and judicial
decisions are simply “incoherent,” then how could changing values
inform our legal decision making?
Consider the example of LGBTQ+ rights. Until very
recently, in US culture the idea of acceptance for gays and lesbians
was outside the scope of majority views. It seems to me that the
change in perspective regarding these rights is particularly
difficult to account for as an example of social coherence reasoning
under the more formal approach. The formal interpretation would
suggest that we came to see discrimination against LGBTQ+
people as inconsistent with longstanding principles, and
homophobia as rationally incoherent with existing doctrine.
Is this interpretation, in terms of inconsistency with
longstanding principles, apt? Let me suggest a different
interpretation of that history -- one that, I’ll argue, is a better fit
with the more individualistic understanding of coherence. In this
alternative, it’s not that American homophobia was somehow
rationally incoherent: it existed in a certain widely -- though
obviously not universally -- shared culture and value system
surrounding sexuality in general, one in which sex was only for
married heterosexual people, and one that was informed by the
idea that a woman’s sexuality fell under the purview of a man -her father, husband, or some other man. But over time sexual
values changed. As a result of complex social and cultural factors,
sex came to be understood more through the lens of personal
autonomy, and LGBTQ+ people engaged in highly effective
activism that undercut homophobic sentiments and beliefs.
20

Id.
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Legal theorist Rebecca Ryan’s 1995 essay on the history of
the marital rape exception recounts a narrative that supports this
kind of interpretation.21 Historically, marriage was thought to
subsume the women’s will under that of her husband, but complex
cultural value shifts put pressure on this idea.22 The rise of
individualism more generally made dependency relations
awkward to theorize, and once women were not seen as on a par
with servants, it became impossible to deny that women have
autonomy rights of their own. Forced sex came to be seen as a
violation of those autonomy rights rather than as a mere violation
of chastity.23 Once the norms shifted, the idea that marital rape is
impossible did come to seem “incoherent”: it was inconsistent with
the values expressed in other laws and social norms. Only then
could feminists fight to have the contradiction resolved through a
legal recognition that marital rape is rape.
Analogously, in this alternative explanation of LGBTQ+
rights, yes: once sexual values are understood in terms of personal
autonomy rights, then yes, it does, in fact, become inconsistent to
allow heterosexual people to have rights that gay people don’t
have. That is, we can then say that legalized discrimination
against LGBTQ+ people is “out of step with other fixed features of
the constitutional system.”24 But I would say that it is out of step
with a set of beliefs informed by a particular moral system, and
one that is increasingly, though again not universally, shared. It’s
not so much that we suddenly recognized that this form of
discrimination was morally incoherent with foundational texts
and had always been so, as the formal interpretation of the social
coherence model would seem to suggest.
This way of understanding social change would suggest that
we need the less formal interpretation of social coherence. In the
less formal interpretation, we could appeal to the way that values
shifted, to say that what may not have been incoherent in the past
is now incoherent: to deny LGBTQ+ rights is inconsistent with the
now common framing of sex in terms of autonomy rights,
individual freedom, and consent. Indeed, there are several places
21
REBECCA M. RYAN , A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION, 9411001 (1995).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE, 44 (2017).
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in the book that seem to support this less formal interpretation,
and several arguments that involve appeal to “intuitive” matters
like what is harmful, what constitutes a trivial harm and what
constitutes a serious one, and so on.25 In this interpretation, it’s
not just foundational texts and legal decisions but also “shared”
moral beliefs that are currently “deep” or “widespread.”26 This
would allow for more of a role for morally shifting perspectives.
But this interpretation raises new and difficult questions.
The main question is: what does it mean for a moral belief to be
“shared” or “deep” or “widespread,” especially in a highly varied
society like the US? This is, of course, a question as old as the hills,
but let me draw out two specifically relevant aspects of it here.
First, the framing of the issues in terms of “social coherence”
and especially this use of the term “coherence” risks the
implication that people with values different from the US
mainstream or majority are somehow “incoherent.” This seems to
me a regrettable formulation. Many people endorse values that
diverge from the mainstream in some way. For example, look at
economic values. It’s become a kind of orthodoxy in contemporary
United States to favor economic “growth” above all else. But as we
are increasingly seeing, economic growth is compatible with
skyrocketing inequality, as the rich get richer and everyone else
gets poorer. Does this mean the person who favors increased
equality is somehow incoherent? Or what about the libertarian,
who favors economic liberty whether or not it promotes growth,
just on grounds of liberty rights -- is that person “incoherent”?
Before the last few decades, there was a widespread belief that
same-sex activity was inherently bad, even if it was inherently
bad. Does that mean early LGBTQ+ activists were “incoherent”? I
would say that to label these people with the term “incoherent”
wrongly suggests that they have a set of beliefs that is internally
irrational or inconsistent, when in reality they do not. This
delegitimates non-majority views.
A second specific and related point has to do with whose
beliefs are thought to matter. Frankly, when I hear talk of “our
shared perspective” I often have an instinctive feeling of worry. In
the past “our shared perspective” has often been a way of saying
25
26

Id.
Id.
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“the perspective of people who are white, male, and moneyed.”
Together with the previous point, we see an especial danger—that
views that are not only “minority” views in a statistical sense but
also held by people who are relatively disenfranchised will be
labeled “incoherent” and thus de-legitimated. Sometimes, as with
early LGBTQ+ activists, these are the views that we ought to pay
more attention to.
None of this shows that the social coherence model can’t be
used for its intended purpose. But it does, in my opinion, highlight
certain difficulties with it. First, the “social” in social coherence
might be a problem. Evaluative critique often comes from those
outside the mainstream, or from those who are disenfranchised,
and for “social coherence” to ignore these views or treat them as
“incoherent” in the sense of “irrational” or “impossible to
understand” would be a mistake. Second, and partly for this
reason, social coherence cannot replace, but rather must co-exist
with a more individualistic theory of moral reasoning and
judgment—one that we must draw on for a full accounting of why,
exactly, one decision is better justified than another in cases of
complexity and conflict. Finally, if I am right that some entrenched
disagreements are ones that are based on deep value conflicts, and
that in these cases it is possible to have multiple sets of beliefs that
are internally coherent yet disagree with one another, this puts
pressure on the question of how, exactly, the agreement of “social
coherence” comes about.

